two sides, and collaboration in the economic development of the peanut basin -was established by the early twentieth century and remained consistent for the rest of Bamba's life. The pattern was already manifest when Bamba returned from his first exile in I902. I suggest that this pattern was also applied to the other marabouts and brotherhoods, and that it originated to a large extent in changes in practice and perspective in the colonial administration. The Government General of French West Africa that was established at the beginning of the twentieth century had more resources, confidence and knowledge than its predecessors. It also developed, in the form of its plan to take over Mauritania, a new model of relations between Muslim authorities and European rule. But the movement had serious weaknesses. First, the haste. Ma Ba took little time to prepare his teaching or following, much less to formulate a program to replace the practices of those he was criticizing.10 Second, his willingness to coerce Muslims into participation. Coercion was the experience of the young Bamba and his father, who were forced to migrate from Baol to the Rip in about i865 and to support the cause. Third, Ma Ba's own strong political ambitions, even while he was delivering the traditional Muslim critique of political power. These dimensions may help to explain the defeat at the battle of Somb in I 867, when Ma Ba was killed and Lat Dior returned to Cayor. They certainly go a long way to explaining the struggle among his successors, a struggle which has gone down in the traditions of 8 I elaborate on this in somewhat greater detail in 'Beyond resistance and collaboration', I5o-i60. 9 Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge I998, English edition from I988 French edition), i96 ff.; he relies heavily on Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal. Sine-Saloum, I847-I9I4 (Edinburgh, Senegambia as an example of fitna, internecine strife which weakens the fabric of Islam.1" Bamba was in his teen years during this time. After Ma Ba's death, he and his father joined Lat Dior in Cayor and lived there during the I 870s and early i88os. As king or Damel, Lat Dior was struggling with the growing French presence and a variety of critiques of his power. The fundamental contradiction was between his agents of power at the court and his constituents in the countryside.12
One important critique came from a group called the Madiyanke.13 Amadu Madiyu and his brothers emerged on the Senegalese stage in the late i86os, in the midst of a devastating cholera epidemic. They formulated a commentary on contemporary society, the exploitation of the royal courts, and the close relations of certain chiefs with the French administration in St Louis. They pushed this critique further than Ma Ba, and won a considerable following in northwestern Senegal.
The Madiyanke forced Lat Dior into closer ties with St Louis, and he in turn helped persuade Governor Valiere to intervene with colonial troops in i875.14 The combined army routed the 'Muslim' forces at Samba Sadio. The Madiyanke leaders and most of the followers were killed, whereupon the victors confiscated their possessions, as was the custom. The French were not well informed about these developments. They operated at a distance, in geographical and social terms, from the Murid milieu. They heard more about the external trappings, the Sufi affiliations, or about the former ceddo who had gravitated into his circle. When they arrested and exiled Bamba a few years later, they apparently thought that they could disperse his community -or at least restrain its growth. The movement also solved a social problem in ways that the chiefs could not: it transformed the slaves and former slaves, who supplied so much of the agricultural labor of Senegal, into followers. As disciples, or clients of the marabouts, the former slaves would be free but contained within a structure; they were much less likely to attract the attention of humanitarians or antislavery interests." During Bamba's absence the core leadership remained in place. The French authorities did not expect the community to collapse, nor did they anticipate a prolonged exile of the founder. Indeed, they hoped that he would return to the peanut basin, more aware than ever of the bonds of cooperation. Bamba and the other marabout leaders, born in the mid-nineteenth century, bore no stigma for the excesses of the anciens regimes, and they had no official role in the new colonial order. They could justify their cooperation in terms of those excesses of violence, which affected Muslims as much as non-Muslims, and in terms of the weakness of Muslim societies relative to the new colonial authorities. They saw the opportunity for islamization provided by the new conditions of relative stability when the colonial regime controlled the supply of firearms, clamped down on raiding, and reduced the resources on which traditional chiefs and warriors had relied for centuries. This new generation of marabouts realized that the administration would not interfere with the practice of Islam; indeed, the colonial authorities might even encourage it once they felt a stronger measure of control.
EARLY
Bamba had a more difficult adaptation to this new reality than his maraboutic contemporaries. This was partly because of his constituency. His crown soldiers, slaves and former slaves required more adjustment and aroused more suspicion for the colonial authorities -in contrast, for example, to the trading community which loomed so large in the entourage of Malik Sy. It was also because Bamba was slower to realize the increased capacity of the emerging new regime. The colonial authorities were gathering strength, and were able to reach much further into the spaces where marabouts and their communities had found autonomy in the past. But Bamba had survived the harsh years of exile and the effort to break his spirit. He saw that his movement had survived in his absence. These realizations, along with the
